We consider cloud computing server infrastructures for big data applications, which consist of multiple server sites connected over a wide-area network. These sites house a number of servers, network elements and local-area connections, and the wide-area network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between them. We model this infrastructure as a system of systems, wherein the sites and wide-area network are represented by their cyber and physical components. These components can be disabled by cyber and physical attacks, and also can be protected against them using component reinforcements. The effects of attacks propagate within the individual systems, and also beyond them via the wide-area network. We characterize these effects using correlations at two levels using: (a) aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual site or network, and (b) first-order differential conditions on system survival probabilities that characterize the componentlevel correlations within individual systems. We formulate a game between an attacker and a provider using utility functions composed of survival probability and cost terms. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for the expected capacity of the infrastructure given by the number of operational servers connected to the network, using the sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions.
INTRODUCTION
Big data applications over cloud computing infrastructures may require pooling severs from multiple server sites that are connected over wide-area networks. In these infrastructures, the wide-area network plays a critical, asymmetric role: its failures render the servers unreachable to users even if they are operational, and in extreme cases can render the entire infrastructure unavailable. We represent such an infrastructure by a system of systems consisting of the sites, S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N and the wide-area network S N +1 [21] . The sites are complex systems, each consisting of several discrete cyber components, including servers and network devices, and physical components, including site network fiber connections and Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system.
A key performance metric for this infrastructure is the capacity given by the number of servers that are operational and accessible by users over the wide-area network. A variety of cyber and physical attacks can be launched on its components that degrade the capacity in different ways. The servers are accessible to users over the network, which makes them vulnerable to cyber attacks that can divert their processing power or simply crash them. In contrast, network routers are geographically dispersed with a restricted access by network administrators. Thus, cyber attacks on them require different techniques compared to server attacks, and have different effects on the capacity. Successful attacks on routers can disconnect significant portions of the network, rendering the servers at disconnected sites unavailable to users. Attacks on network elements at the sites such as LAN switches and border routers have similar but somewhat localized degradation effects. The increasing deployment of monitoring control apps for site HVAC systems, particularly on smart phones, makes them vulnerable to cyber attacks, which for example can increase the facility temperature to trigger server shutdowns. Physical attacks in the form of fiber cuts and cooling tower degradations represent different attack vectors that degrade this infrastructure; however, they require physical proximity access by attackers. For example, fibers connecting server sites to gateway routers and in between wide-area routers may be physically cut, thereby making sites and portions of the network inaccessible to users. Degradations of HVAC cooling towers, which are typically in open areas outside the sites, can lead to the shutdown of all site servers and network devices at the site.
Various component reinforcements may be put in place to protect against the above attacks, including replicating servers and routers in fail-over configurations, and installing redundant fiber lines to sites and between wide-area network router locations. While such reinforced components can survive direct attacks, some servers may still become unavailable to users due to propagative effects of attacks on other components [17] . For instance, even if the servers at a site are hardened against cyber attacks, they can all be made unavailable, for example, by cutting the fiber connections to the site with a single physical attack, or by bringing down the HVAC system by a single cyber attack on control app. Non-reinforced components, on the other hand, will be disabled by direct attacks. The reinforcements and attacks incur costs to the provider and attacker, respectively, and their corresponding benefits depend not only on the components but also on various correlations between components and systems, due to the propagation of disruptions within the sites and between them over the network. In this paper, we consider a simplified version wherein the infrastructure providers strategically reinforce a number of components to balance the costs with resultant capacity by taking into account various correlations.
Let n i denote the number of components of S i of which y i and x i denote the number of components attacked and reinforced, respectively. Let P i be the survival probability of S i , and P I be the survival probability of entire infrastructure. The expected capacity is the expected number of available components, given by
which reflects the part of infrastructure that survives the attacks. Also, let S −i denote the infrastructure without S i , and P −i be its survival probability. The relative importance of S i to the infrastructure is captured by using the aggregate failure correlation function C i [22] , which is given by the failure probability of S −i given the failure of S i . Intuitively, C i quantifies how important S i is to the entire infrastructure.
The important asymmetric role of the wide-area network is specified by two conditions [21] : (a) C N +1 = 1 indicates that a complete network failure disrupts the entire infrastructure, and (b) C i = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , indicates that disruptions of individual systems are uncorrelated when considered among themselves, namely, not including the network. Within individual systems, the correlations between components are captured by simple first-order differential conditions on P i of S i expressed using its multiplier function Λ i [22] . This two-level characterization helps to conceptualize the basic correlations in this infrastructure, and provides insights into the needed defense strategies by naturally "separating" the system-level considerations from the component-level aspects.
A game between an attacker and a provider involves balancing the costs of attacks and reinforcements of systems, given by L A (y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) and L D (x 1 , . . . , x N +1 ), respectively, with the survival probability of the infrastructure P I . One of three utility function considered in this paper, namely, the sum-form utility function is given by
which will be minimized by the provider, and the scalar д D ≥ 0 represents the benefit of keeping the infrastructure operational. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is determined by the optimization of the utility functions by the defender and attacker, which in turn determines the resultant capacity of the infrastructure. At NE, we derive an expression for the expected capacity for the sum-form utility function, which indicates that higher gain д D leads to lower number of operational and accessible servers. It also provides additional insights, for example, that a faster than linear C i leads to a lower number of available servers.
In addition to the sum-form, we also carry out similar NE analysis using a product-form utility function that represents a different cost-benefit trade-off compared to sum-form utility function (Section 4.2). Additionally, we also consider the composite utility functions that subsume both sum-form and product-form utilities as special cases (Section 4.2). The expected capacity at NE is expressed in terms of cost term L D and its derivative, the aggregate correlation functions C i , i = 1, 2 . . . , N + 1, and the system multiplier functions, Λ i , i = 1, 2 . . . , N + 1. It provides critical information on the dependence of capacity on system parameters, in particular C i and Λ i , and utility functions. Furthermore, by decomposing the system models into sub-models, such as cyber and physical sub-models, finer relationships can be inferred between system parameters, such as refined versions of C i and Λ i , and the capacity.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We briefly describe the related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the multisite cloud computing infrastructure model of [21] along with the aggregate correlation function and differential conditions on system survival probabilities, and expand it to include HVAC components. We present our game-theoretic formulation in Section 4 using the sum-form and product-form utilities in Section 4.1, and using the composite utility functions in Section 4.2, wherein we derive NE conditions and estimates for the system survival probabilities. We present and discuss the estimates for expected capacity in Section 5. We present conclusions in Section 6.
RELATED WORK
The infrastructures for smart energy grids, cloud computing, and intelligent transportation systems are composed of complex constituent systems that rely on communications networks. For widearea operations, these networks play a critical asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity needed for continued infrastructure operations. In particular, for cloud computing infrastructures, the wide-area network is essential in making the servers at multiple distributed sites transparently available to application users. For big data applications, servers from multiple distributed sites may have to be assembled to meet the demands for large computing capacity, since a single site may not have sufficient servers when needed. The networked infrastructures with various cyber and physical components are increasingly susceptible to cyber and physical attacks. In response, the infrastructure providers must employ defense measures and strategies against the attacks by taking into account various correlations within and in between the constituent systems. For example, the dependencies of cyber infrastructures on physical components such as fiber connections and HVAC systems, must be explicitly accounted for, in addition to defending against cyber attacks.
Game-theoretic methods have been particularly useful in developing defense strategies for a broad set of critical infrastructures [1, 2, 7, 13] . A comprehensive account of defense and attack models in various game-theoretic formulations has been presented in [11] . Recent advances in cyber and cyber-physical systems required the development of a class of game theoretic solutions to match the cyber security scenarios [13, 27] , and, in particular, for securing cyber-physical networks [3, 26] including power grids [4, 8, 15, 18] , and predicting and modeling of cyber-physical systems [14, 16] . The survivability of infrastructures has been among the main considerations in these game formulations, wherein the survival probability terms are integrated into the models [12] , for example, into discrete models of cyber-physical infrastructures in various Stackelberg game formulations [5] . For infrastructures with a large number of discrete components, a subclass of these models has been studied in [25] using the number of cyber and physical components that are attacked and reinforced as the main variables. These models are coarser compared to the models that consider the attacks and reinforcements of individual cyber and physical components. Nevertheless, they are useful in providing first, albeit coarse, strategies for several multi-site server infrastructures, since their servers are generic and their number is a good indicator of the infrastructure capacity. Under these formulations, various forms of correlation functions have been used to capture the dependencies amongst the constituent systems and their components [22, 23, 25] .
Collections of systems with complex interactions have been studied using game-theoretic formulations in [6, 10] , and their twolevel correlations have been studied using the sum-form utility functions in [22] and the product-form utility functions in [23] . These two utility functions are unified in [19] , and the sum-form utility function has been studied under the asymmetric role of communications network in [21] . These two works were further unified in [20] by using the composite utility functions; they also explicitly account for the asymmetric network role.
The multi-site cloud computing infrastructure was discussed as an example for sum-form and product-form utility functions in [21] and composite utility function in [20] under the asymmetric role of the communications network. In this paper, we develop a comprehensive treatment of this infrastructure by including HVAC system and providing complete details of NE conditions and capacity estimates. In particular, we relate the abstract definitions of correlation functions and system multiplier functions to components of multi-site server infrastructure. 
MULTI-SITE SERVER INFRASTRUCTURE
A distributed cloud computing infrastructure consisting of N sites, each with l i servers at site i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N has been studied by using separate cyber and physical models for each site in [19] . Here, we expand this model to incorporate both cyber and physical aspects of HVAC of a site, namely, its mobile phone app and cooling tower located outside the facility. The sites are connected over a wide-area network S N +1 as shown in Figure 1 . The components of the network include routers each of which manages l N +1 connections as shown in Figure 2 .
This infrastructure is subject to a variety of cyber and physical attacks on its components. Cyber attacks on the servers may be launched remotely over the network since the servers are accessible to users. Meanwhile, routers are located at geographically separated sites and access to them is limited (to network administrators), and they are not as easily accessible over the network. Cyber attacks on routers require different techniques and represent different costs to the attacker compared to server attacks. Furthermore, this infrastructure is subject to physical attacks in the form of fiber cuts, which require a proximity access by the attacker. Cutting the network fibers that connect server sites to routers will disconnect the entire site, making it inaccessible to the users. And, such attacks may also be launched on the network fibers between routers at different locations on the network.
The infrastructure provider may employ a number of reinforcements to protect against attacks, including replicating the servers and routers to support fail-over operations, and installing physically separated redundant fiber lines to the sites and between router locations. These measures could require significant costs, and hence must be strategically chosen.
System-Level Correlations
The correlations between systems, including the wide-area network, in these infrastructures are characterized in terms of their survival probabilities as follows. Condition 3.1. Aggregate Correlation Function [22, 23] : Let C i denote the failure probability of rest of the infrastructure S −i given the failure of S i , and let C −i denote the failure probability of S i given the failure of S −i . Then, the survival probability of the infrastructure is given by
The cyber and physical aspects of a site S i can be represented by using two finer sub-models S (i,c) and S (i,p) that correspond to cyber and physical model, respectively. Similarly, those of the network S N +1 are represented by S (N +1,c) and S (N +1,p) , which are the cyber and physical models, respectively, as illustrated in Figure  3 . Let n (i,c) and n (i,p) represent the cyber and physical components of S i which correspond to the number of components of S i,c) and
denote the number of cyber and physical components that are reinforced, respectively, such that
and y (i,p) denote the number of cyber and physical components that are attacked, respectively, such that y i = y (i,c) + y (i,p) . The relationships between these system-level models can be captured using refined versions of the aggregate correlation function as follows. For the wide-area network, we have
which reflects that a cyber attack on a router will disrupt all its l N +1 connections, thereby illustrating the amplification effect of these cyber attacks. For the server sites, we have a similar effect due to physical fiber attacks denoted by label p f reflected by
which indicates that at site S i the fiber disruption will disconnect all its l i servers. Similarly, the cyber attach on site HVAC app denoted by label c h leads to
which indicates that at site S i the HVAC disruption will affect all its l i servers. In the limiting case, each component can be represented as a singleton sub-model S i, j such that
x (i, j) and
Here, x (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} and y (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} that indicate if the component represented by S i, j is reinforced and attacked, respectively. It is instructive to consider some special cases of the aggregate correlation function. Under the statistical independence of system failures we have C i = 1 − P −i , where P −i is the survival probability of S −i , since the failure probability of S −i is not dependent on P i . Under this condition, we have P I = P i P −i as expected.
The important asymmetric role of the wide-area network is characterized using the following conditions. Condition 3.2. Asymmetric Network and Uncorrelated Systems Conditions: [21] The aggregated correlation functions of S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 satisfy the conditions: (i) for the network S N +1 , we have C N +1 = 1, and (ii) for the constituent systems, we have
The part (i) leads to P I = P −(N +1) which indicates the role of rest of infrastructure S −(N +1) without the network, namely, its survival probability is the same as that for server sites together. The part (ii) leads to P I = P i + P −i − 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , which linearly depends on each of failure probabilities of the constituent system S i and rest of infrastructure S −i . It is important to note that although direct correlations between the site failures zero (part (ii) above), these site failures are still indirectly related through the network. In particular, the failures of S i and S j , which are parts of S −(N +1) , are correlated to the network via C N +1 ; for example, they both become simultaneously unavailable when the wide-area network fails.
The effects of reinforcements and attacks on host sites and widearea network can be separated using the two following conditions:
(i) first condition,
≈ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , indicates that reinforcing the server site S i does not directly impact the survival probability of other sites or network; and (ii) second condition,
. . , N and j i, indicates that reinforcing server site or network S j does not directly impact the survival probability of server site or network S i .
While the reinforcements to individual server sites or network are not directly reflected in other systems, their failures may still be correlated due to the underlying system structures as reflected in the aggregated correlation function of the network C N +1 . These systemlevel considerations for the provider are captured by the following condition which is obtained by differentiating P I in Condition 3.1 with respect to x i and ignoring the terms corresponding to parts (i) and (ii) above. 
for the provider.
The condition captures the effect on the increment in P I as a result of the change in the number of reinforced components x i of S i . It is the sum of (a) increment in individual system survival probability P i weighted by "non-correlation" term (1 − C i ), and (ii) increment in correlation C i weighted by the failure probability 1 − P i of S i . For the sites S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have
For the network S (N +1) , we have
Under the Condition 3.2, C i is constant but its partial derivatives with respect to x i could be non-zero, as other parameters change to keep it constant.
Component-Level Correlations
The survival probabilities for server sites and network satisfy the following differential condition that characterizes the correlations at the component level within each site and network [22, 24] . Condition 3.4. System Multiplier Functions: The survival probabilities P i and P −i of system S i and S −i , respectively, satisfy the following conditions: there exist system multiplier functions Λ i and Λ −i such that
We now consider a special case where the attacker and provider choose the components to attack and reinforce, respectively, according to uniform distribution. Corresponding to the site physical model S (i,p) , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , there are [n (i,p) − x (i,p) ] + nonreinforced fiber connections, where [x] + = x for x > 0, and [x] + = 0 otherwise. Similarly, there are [n (i,c) − x (i,c) ] + nonreinforced servers. If a cyber component (i.e., a server) is reinforced, it will survive a cyber attack but can be brought down indirectly by a fiber attack. Then, the probability that a cyber-reinforced component survives y (i,p) fiber attacks is approximated by
where the normalization constant f (i,c) is appropriately chosen. On the other hand, if a cyber component is not reinforced, it can be brought down by either a direct cyber attack, or indirectly through a fiber attack. Thus, we approximate the survival probability of a cyber component at site i as
which reflects the additional lowering of the survival probability in inverse proportion to the level of cyber attack y (i,c) . Under the independence of component attacks and reinforcements, the survival probability of the cyber sub-model S (i,c) is given by
which in turn provides
Using the above formulae, for cyber model S (i,c) of site S i , we have
It is interesting to note that the system multiplier function Λ (i,c) does not depend on the cyber reinforcements term x (i,c) even though it corresponds to
. The function, however, depends on the physical reinforcement term x (i,p) .
Under the statistical independence of cyber and physical attacks, for the cyber and physical sub-models, namely, S (i,c) and S (i,p) respectively, we have the following generalization of Eq. (3.1)
By differentiating the equation with x (i,c) , we obtain
Then, by noting that
which enables us to approximate Λ i by Λ (i,c) .
Consider that HVAC sub-model S (i,h) of site i is further decomposed into cyber and physical singleton sub-models represented by S (i,c h ) and S (i,p h ) , respectively. Then, we have
that corresponds to cyber attack and defense on HVAC app. Similarly, we have
that corresponds to physical attack and defense on HVAC cooling tower. Table 1 : Gain and cost terms and their multipliers for sum-form and product-form utilities of provider.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
The provider's objective is to make the infrastructure resilient by reinforcing x i components of S i by optimizing the utility function. Similarly, the attacker's objective is to disrupt the infrastructure by attacking y i components of S i by optimizing the corresponding utility function. A game between an attacker and a provider involves balancing the costs of attacks and reinforcements of systems, given by L A (y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) and L D (x 1 , . . . , x N +1 ), respectively, with the survival probability of the infrastructure.
Sum-Form and Product-Form Utility Functions
The product-form disutility function is given by
which will be minimized by the provider; it represents the "wasted" cost to the provider since it is the expected cost under the condition that the infrastructure fails. The sum-form and product-form utility functions [21] reflect two different values attached to keeping the infrastructure operational: the sum-form represents a weaker coupling of probability and cost terms, whereas the product-form utility function is their product. In general, they lead to qualitatively different defense strategies that are derived separately, and the corresponding expressions for the survival probabilities appear to be structurally different. The composite utility functions lead to simpler expressions for P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and N I at the Nash Equilibrium (NE). NE conditions are derived by equating the corresponding derivatives of the utility functions to zero, which yields the following for sum-and product-form utilities, respectively:
. . , N + 1 for the provider.
In particular, the dependence of P i on cost terms and aggregate correlation functions, and their partial derivatives, can be presented in a compact form by using composite gain-cost and composite multiplier terms (to be defined in Section 4.2).
Under Conditions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4, estimates of the survival probability of system S i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 are derived in [21] 
where A = + and A = × correspond to sum-form and product-form, respectively, such that
0. Under the asymmetric network correlation coefficient C N +1 = 1, the survival probability of the network is given by
InP A i;D , the term Λ i appears in the denominator with a negative sign. Thus, in qualitative terms, it depends linearly with a multiplier a on the logarithm of the number of cyber attacks y (i,c) , and inversely on the logarithm of y (i,p) − x (i,p) + which is the number of attacks exceeding the reinforcements. The sign of the multiplier a could be positive or negative based on the other factors
and ξ A i , where A = +, ×. This condition may appear somewhat counter-intuitive at the surface but note that it only characterizes the states that satisfy NE conditions, and in particular, it illustrates the richness of infrastructure behavior at NE.
Composite Utility Functions
The sum-form and product-form utility functions are generalized by the composite utility function [19, 20] given by
where the first product term corresponds to the reward and the second product term corresponds to the cost. Within the product terms, F D,G and F D, L are the reward and cost multiplier functions, respectively, of the provider, and G D and L D represent the reward and cost, respectively, of keeping the infrastructure operational. Similarly, we consider that the attacker minimizes
where F A,G and F A, L are the reward and cost multiplier functions, respectively, of the attacker, and G A and L A represent the reward and cost of disrupting the infrastructure operation, respectively. The provider's objective is to make the infrastructure resilient by reinforcing x i components of S i by optimizing the utility function.
Similarly, the attacker's objective is to disrupt the infrastructure by attacking y i components of S i by optimizing the corresponding utility function. NE conditions are derived by equating the corresponding derivatives of the utility functions to zero, which yields
as the composite gain-cost term, wherein the gain G D and loss L D are "amplified" by the derivatives of their corresponding multiplier functions with respect to P I . We then define
as the composite multiplier term, wherein the gain multiplier F D,G and cost multiplier F D, L are "amplified" by the derivatives of their corresponding gain and cost terms with respect to x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1, respectively. These two terms lead to the compact NE condition
. Various terms of the composite utility function specialized to sum-form and product-form utilities are shown in Table 1 . Under Conditions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4, the following estimates of the survival probability of system S i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 are derived in [22] 
Under the asymmetric network correlation coefficient C N +1 = 1, the survival probability of the network is given by
The system survival probability estimatesP i;D provide qualitative information about the effects of various parameters including aggregated correlation coefficient C i , system multiplier functions ConsiderP A i;D above, the term Λ i appears in the denominator with a negative sign. Thus, in qualitative terms, it depends linearly with a multiplier a on the logarithm of the number of cyber attacks y (i,c) , and inversely on the logarithm of y (i,p) − x (i,p) + which is the number of attacks exceeding the reinforcements. The sign of the multiplier a could be positive or negative based on the other factors
EXPECTED CAPACITY ESTIMATES
We now consider the capacity of the infrastructure under x i reinforcements and y i attacks on components of S i , which can be further partitioned into the corresponding values of sub-systems of S i .
Sum-Form and Product-Form Utility Functions
For sum-from and product-from utility functions, the following expected capacity estimate is derived in [21] , which provides a single, simplified expression. Under Conditions 3.1-3.4, the expected capacity is given by
For the sum-form,
indicates that higher gain д D leads to a lower number of operational components. For the product form,
indicates that higher survival probability of the infrastructure P I leads to lower number of operational components. In contrast, P I does not appear in N + I for the sum-from. The dependence on Λ i is similar in both cases, namely, faster than linear leads to lower number of available component, and vice versa. The dependence on cost term L D is somewhat different due to its presence in the denominator for product-form, even though
appears in the numerator in both forms. In particular, higher L D leads to lower expected capacity for the product-form but has no similar effect for sum-form. In general ∂L D ∂x i > 0 since the cost increases as more components are reinforced. In both forms, the expected capacity increases with this gradient but differently; for the some-form the dependence is linear whereas for product-form the dependence is less pronounced since it corresponds to the gradient of ln L D .
In terms of the expected capacity N A I of the sub-models of S i , the dependence on y (i,c) and y (i,p) − x (i,p) + is more direct, and it is qualitatively similar for both sum-form and product-form, since the term Λ i appears in the denominator. By using the expressions from Section 3.2, we obtain the following expected capacity estimates: for the sum-form,
and for the product form,
In both cases, the multipliers n i , д D and L D are positive, and it is reasonable to assume the condition ∂C D ∂x i ≥ 0 as described above. Thus, the expected capacity decreases with the number of cyber attacks y (i,c) . The opposite trend is true with respect to y (i,p) − x (i,p) + , which implies no effect if the number of reinforced components is at least as large as the number of components attacks, and otherwise the expected capacity increases with the difference. In both cases, the dependence on the number of servers l i at site i is qualitatively similar in that the expected capacity increases proportional to its logarithm.
The term n i ξ A i Λ i that corresponds to site S i can be further refined by decomposing into its sub-models, which provides insights into their individual effects. The impact of HVAC control app at site i is reflected in its corresponding term
obtained from Eq (3.2), which shows that reinforcing the app, that is, x (i,c h ) = 1, nullifies the amplification effect of l i since [y (i,c h ) − x (i,c h ) ] + = 0 for both sum-form and product-form utility functions.
Such analysis can be carried out for other critical components of the sites to gain information on which components to reinforce for higher utility. In particular, reinforcing the site fiber routes will have similar effect on nullification effect but server reinforcements will have somewhat lesser impact.
Composite Utility Functions
For the composite utility functions, under Conditions 3.1-3.4, the expected capacity is derived in [20] 
This expression indicates that a lower composite gain-cost L D G, L and higher composite multiplier F D,i G, L lead to lower expected capacity. Compared to the expressions for N + I and N × I , this expression is simpler due to the generality of the composite gain-cost and composite multiplier, which are complex by themselves in that sum-form and product-form are subsumed by them as indicated in Table 1 . Typically, the composite gain-cost L D G, L is negative (e.g. −д D for sum-form) since it is minimized by the provider; thus, its lower value is more negative and has a higher magnitude. Also, larger values of Λ i also lead to lower expected capacity. In particular, the condition Λ i > 1, called the faster than linear growth of
, leads to lower expected capacity. This seems counter-intuitive since faster improvement in P i due to increase in x i leads to lower expected capacity, but note that it only characterizes the states that satisfy NE conditions.
Using expressions from Section 3.2, we obtain the following expected number of servers for the composite utility functions,
In the equation, n i is positive, and it is reasonable to assume that
at NE, and the survival probability of entire infrastructure P I does not decrease with x i . Thus, the expected capacity decreases with y (i,c) and the opposite is true with respect to y (i,p) − x (i,p) + as discussed in the previous section. In both cases, the dependence on the number of servers l i at site i is qualitatively similar in that the expected capacity increases proportional to its logarithm, also as in the previous section. As in sum-form and product-form utility functions, the term
can be decomposed using sub-models of site i to assess the impacts of its parts, in particular, its components. For HVAC app at site i, we have the corresponding term . Also, such analysis can be carried out for other components, and in a limiting case, each component can be modeled as a singleton sub-model, in which case their attack and reinforcement variables are Boolean.
The dependencies considered here for the sub-models are quite simple as a result of the statistical independence and uniform distributions of reinforcements and attacks. Even under such simple conditions, the detailed NE conditions are quite complex to characterize, but they do provide qualitative insights into the effects of underlying parameters.
The utility functions considered in this paper do not explicitly use the capacity term. In stead, they are driven by the infrastructure level considerations by using P I , which in turn leads to expressions for the capacity that involve other terms that contribute to P I .
We consider a class of infrastructures with multiple server sites connected over a wide-area network, which plays an asymmetric role by providing the critical connectivity between them. By utilizing correlations at system-and component-level, we formulated the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an attacker and a provider, by using sum-form and product-form utility functions and their generalization using composite utility functions. We derived Nash Equilibrium conditions that provide compact expressions for the expected capacity given by the number of operational and accessible servers. They provide insightful information about the dependence of capacity on cost and correlation parameters as well as the number of reinforced and attacked components. In particular, by employing sub-models of the sites, the effect of parts of the system on the expected capacity can be inferred by using the corresponding multiplier functions. Such inferences can be extended to individual components of the sites; for example, it can be inferred that reinforcement of HVAC app nullifies the amplification effect due to co-location of the servers at sites. These results are obtained by applying the extensions of previous results on interconnected systems [9, 10] and cyber-physical infrastructures [24] to the multi-site server infrastructure.
The formulation studied in this paper can be extended to include cases where targeted attacks and reinforcements of specific individual components are explicitly represented. It is of future interest to compare this formulation to ones whose utility functions explicitly utilize the capacity term in place of infrastructure survival probability terms. Another future direction is to consider the simultaneous cyber and physical attacks on multiple systems and components, and sequential game formulations of this problem. Performance studies of our approach using more detailed models of cloud computing infrastructure would be of future interest.
